This paper characterizes empirically how government budget variables, such as spending, taxes, and deficits, affected private-sector consumption in the high-budget-deficit economy of Israel during the first half of the 1980g. The paper develops and estimates an intertemporal optimizing model of consumption choice by finite-lived individuals. The evidence supports this formulation against the Ricardian infinite-horizon case, but it does not support it when compared to the unrestricted relations in the data.
Introduction
The impact of government budget variables on private-sector consumption is a key issue in assessing the implications of fiscal. and monetary policy on the real side of the economy. In fact there are sharp controversies on this topic, most of which center around the Ricardian-Equivalence proposition !'. The main purpose of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on this key issue for the case of Israel in the first half of the 1980s. This case is of particular interest because of the high volatility of movements in the budget deficit, government spending, and private consumption in an economy with unusually high government budget deficit; the deficit amounting to 15% of output, on average, during this period. These characteristics differ from those of the more stable environments studied in previous empirical works, and thus enable a more powerful test of the comovements of private-sector consumption and publicsector spending and financing variables.
The standard approach in empirical studies of these comovements has been based on directly specifying regression equations linking consumption to disposable income, measures of wealth, government spending, taxes, etc. (See e.g., Kochin (1974) , Tanner (1979) , Feldstein (1982) , Seater (1982 ), Kormendi (1983 , Reid (1985) ). While the results from applying this approach are informative, a limitation, which makes the interpretation of the results ambiguous, is that the connection between the estimated equations and the underlying theoretical model is not made explicit. In contrast, the present study adopts an intertemporal optimizing framework whose implications, derived explicitly in the analysis, are the subject of empirical tests.
Since the seminal contribution of Hall (1978) , numerous studies have applied the intertemporal optimizing approach to examine consumption FR-031/DPR/09-02-86 2 behavior. However, almost none of these studies focus on the comovements of consumption and government-budget variables. V Moreover, these studies typically assume an infinite-horizon consumer. This assumption severely restricts the economic channels through which government-budget finance exerts its effects on consumption, resulting in an extreme case where the model exhibits Ricardian properties. To move away from this extreme case, Blanchard 
The Model
We assume that there are overlapping generations of rational agents that, due to mortality, have finite horizons. Specifically, there is a probability y, smaller than unity, that individuals will survive to the next period. A small open economy is considered, one that takes as given the world interest rate.
Aggregating the budget constraints of all age groups yields the following economy-wide budget constraint: Under the assumptions that individuals maximize expected lifetime utility and that utility exhibits a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution, a, the aggregative consumption function can be written (in percapita terms) as:
where W is wealth and s is the savings/wealth ratio, expressed as = ala and where 6 is the subjective discount factor. Wealth is equal to the difference between the present value of future disposable income, and the value of past debt coninitment RB_1. Accordingly,
and, in turn,
Note that the discount factor used in computing the present value of future incomes is the effective (risk adjusted) factor, yIR.
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which in turn can be written as
Using a similar expression for B1 and the definition of W we can now express consumption as follows:
Notice that includes current and future taxes that are imposed on the private sector. From the intertemporal government budget constraint, the present value of taxes is given by
where C is the real value of government spending, D is the real value of the change in the monetary base induced by the budget deficit, and BC is government debt J. Substituting this expression into and into eq. (1978)). However, when y < 1, the variable affects current consumption over and beyond the impact of C_1. For example, a current-period cut in taxes will result in an increase in perceived wealth (through an increase in He). The reason is that the future tax increases that are needed in order to balance the intertemporal budget constraint of government are given a smaller weight, by the finite-horizon consumers, than the weight they attach to the current cut in taxes.
Empirical Results
To implement eq. (9) it is necessary to specify a tractable empirical counterpart for the infinite forward-looking sums in this equation. The specification that we adopt assumes that all individuals alive at time t expect future values of the components of H to remain at their current (time t) levels. It is further assumed that the econometrician observes individuals' Ht up to an error term ' which is orthogonal to presently known information at time t. Imposing these assumptions yields 
Substituting Eq. (11) into (10) yields the following equation
where B1G is the summation term on the right hand side of (11), and (12)). Relaxing and refining these assumptions seems to us a promising task for further work, one that may result in a more FR-031/DPR/09-02-86 is the adjusted coefficient of determination and SER is the standard error of the regression. Rows 1 and 2 were estimated by ordinary least squares, and row 3 by nonlinear least squares. Barro (1974) .
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For an exception, see Aschauer (1985) .
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For analysis of effects of fiscal policy in open economies using this type of model, see Frenkel and Razin (1986) .
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Throughout we use the assumption of a constant real rate. While this is a restrictive assumption, it need not be very unrealistic in an economy with widespread indexation in financial markets. 5/ rn this formulation the discount factor is (1/R), while it is (y/R) for private (finite-lived) agents. For a related analysis and test of equality of these discount factors, see van Wijnbergen (1985) .
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The term R_1B1 was treated as a constant in the estimations.
